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INTRODUCTION 
In tort law, liability is composed of three elements: 
damage, negligence, and causation. In order for a jury to 
find a defendant liable for damages, all three elements must 
be present. First 7 damages must have been suffered; second, 
the defendant must have been negligent in his or her 
conduct; and, third, the defendant's negligence must have 
been a cause of the damages suffered by the plaintiff. 
Damage and negligence are defined, according to the Oregon 
Uniform Jury Instructions, as follows: 
Damage refers, not just to physical damage, but 
also to financial and emotional damage, such as the 
costs and emotional pain and suffering. In general, 
it is the duty of every person in our society to use 
reasonable care to avoid damage that would be 
reasonably anticipated. Reasonable care is that 
care which persons of ordinary prudence exercise in 
the management of their own affairs to avoid injury 
to themselves or others. Common-law negligence, 
therefore, is the doing of some act that a 
reasonably car~ful person would not do, or the 
failure to do something that a reasonably careful 
person would do under the same or similar 
circumstances. 
The third condition necessary for a finding of liability is 
a judgment, by the jury, that the existing negligence was, 
in fact, a cause of the damages suffered by the plaintiff. 
The process by which potential jurors arrive at a judgment 
regarding causation and negligence, and the impact those 
judgments have on their judgment regarding liability, is the 
central topic of this research. The basic question under 
consideration is: 'How do jurors determine what caused the 
damage?' 
HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF CAUSATION 
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Discussion of causation is perhaps as old as any topic 
in philosophy. Aristotle (?/1952), in discussing the theory 
of four causes, identifies them as material, formal, 
efficient, and final. Material cause is that from which a 
thing comes into being, such as the material from which a 
house is constructed or the notes from which a tune is 
composed. Formal cause is the form, pattern or essence of a 
thing, such as the relationship between the structural 
components of a house or the relationship between the notes 
of a tune. Efficient cause is that from which change first 
begins, the primary source of change, such as the person who 
conceived the house or wrote the tune. Final cause is that 
for the sake of which a thing is, such as a house being 
built to provide shelter or a tune being composed to provide 
entertainment. 
Present day thought about legal causation reflects, to 
some extent, the A~istotelian view of cause. Shaver (1985), 
in The Attribution of Blame, points out that the 
contemporary meaning of cause most closely approximates 
Aristotle's concepts of efficient and final. Efficient and 
final cause refer respectively to the initiation of action 
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and the intent of the actor, and are relevant to discussions 
of material and proximate cause. 
Efficient cause, in the modern legal sense, is also 
referred to as cause in fact or conditio sine qua non 
(without which not) (Hart & Honore, 1959, p. 85). In tort 
law, the question of 'were the damages, Y, the result of the 
act, or omission, X,' is usually considered as the 
bifurcated question of (1) Would Y have occurred if X had 
not? (efficient cause) and (2) is there a legal principle 
which would preclude the treatment of Y as a consequence of 
X under the law? (proximate cause). The former is a 
question of fact while the latter is a question of policy or 
law. If Y would not have occurred had X not occurred, then 
X is not only a sufficient condition, but also a efficient 
cause or sine qua non of Y (Hart & Honore, 1962, p. 104). 
What is meant by proximate cause is this: 
Because of convenience, of public policy, of a 
rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines 
to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. 
This is not logic. It is practical politics' 
(Pfalsgragh v. Long Island RR co., 1928). 
Hume (1748/1952) first discussed causality in Treatise 
of Human Nature and later in Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding. In this latter treatise, Hume divided 
perception into two classes; ideas and impressions. 
Impressions are vivid perceptions that occur as a direct 
result of experience, while ideas are reflections, memories, 
and constructions that occur based on these impressions. 
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Ideas are associated with one another by either resemblance, 
contiguity in time or space, or cause and effect. According 
to Hume, it is this latter relation which allows us to make 
inferences about matters of fact. Hume argued that 
causation can never be proven, that all we can ever admit to 
is constant conjunction. If however, in our personal 
experience two events are contiguous in time and space and 
have been reliably or constantly conjoined such that one 
event always has temporal precedence over the other, we tend 
to conclude that the former is the cause of the latter. Two 
important components of Hume's argument are .• .. that causes 
and effects are discoverable, not by reason but by 
experience .•. ' Hume (1748/1952 p. 476), and that there must 
be repeated observations of the conjunction between 
antecedent and subsequent events to infer causation. Hence, 
Hume's view has been termed regularity theory. 
Even after one instance or experiment where we 
have observed a particular event to follow upon 
another, we are not entitled to form a general rule 
or foretell what will happen in like cases .... Hume 
(1748/1952 p. 476). 
This fundamental requirement of repeated observations of 
conjunction is also the basis of Kelley's (1967, 1973) 
theory of the attribution of causation (see below). 
The inadequacy of regularity theory to explain 
causation of events is simply that it denies any principle 
of causal necessity, for the only condition it recognizes is 
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constant conjunction. Regularity theory thus fails to 
distinguish causation from mere correlation. 
The best known criticism of Hume's regularity theory 
is perhaps Kant's (1871/1952) Necessity Theory as presented 
in Critique of Pure Reason. Kant intended to provide an 
explanation of our ability to reason independent of 
experience and to show that a judgment of cause is an a 
priori judgment. Kant began his argument by referring to 
the distinction between empirical knowledge, which is gained 
as a result of experience, and a priori knowledge, that 
which is independent of experience. An a priori idea is 
distinguished from an empirical one on the grounds of 
necessity and universality. Kant used the concept of cause 
and effect to explain the principles of necessity and 
universality, since he felt that a judgment of cause admits 
no exceptions and therefore implies both necessity and 
universality. 
The conception of a cause so plainly involves of a 
necessity of connection with an effect, and of a 
strict universality of the law, that the very notion 
of a cause would entirely disappear, were we to 
derive it, like Hume, from a frequent association of 
what happens with that which precedes ..• (Kant 
1871/1952 p. 15). 
Kant's argument that an a priori basis for the determination 
of causality does exist seems to be based in part on the 
observer's recognition of the necessity of a specific 
temporal order in the conjunctive relationship, a condition 
also acknowledged by Hume. Qn the basis of temporal order 
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alone, it can be argued that every effect has not just one, 
but at least one, possible necessary cause, since every 
event has at least· one temporal precedent. The idea of 
necessity makes possible consideration of discounting 
alternative possible causes, since there are many events 
which precede a given effect, and the observer is faced with 
the task of determining whether a given antecedent event is 
necessary or simply conjoint, a circumstance that is not 
demanded using only Hume's constant conjunction principle 
(Shaver 1985). 
The theories of Hume and Kant were proposed to explain 
causal laws of nature and pondered cause and effect in 
physical actions, not human interactions. Thus, the 
theories of regularity and necessity, although important to 
a discussion of the judgment of causation, offer an 
insufficient explanation of the psychological considerations 
involved in a judgment of causation in the context of 
attributing blame or liability because they do not take into 
account human agency (Shaver 1985). 
Shaver's Treatment of Blame and Responsibility 
Shaver (1985) discusses a philosophical position on 
causality, known as Activity Theory, which is relevant to a 
discussion of the attribution of blame. Activity theory is 
so named because it regards human activity as the 
paradigmatic instance of causality within a context of the 
attribution of blame or assessment of liability (Shaver 1985 
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p. 25). Origins of activity theory can be found in the 
writings of Reid (1863), whose version of cause, in contrast 
with that of Hume and Kant, is used in the Aristotelian 
sense of efficient cause; that is, cause is that from which 
change first begins. The significance of activity theory 
lies in its emphasis on the instrumentality of human 
intervention in bringing about an effect. Activity theory 
searches not for universal laws of nature such as those that 
might be revealed by repeated instances of cause and effect, 
but for the cause of any particular thing happening (Shaver 
1985 p. 26). 
Although drawing on regularity and necessity theory as 
well, Shaver's theory of blame is derived primarily from 
activity theory. He states that, 
Our conception of causation thus includes the 
following three concepts: (1) human agency as the 
fundamental idea, (2) necessity as part of agency, 
and (3) temporal priority of cause and effect 
(Shaver 1985 p. 31). 
The concept of human agency as a condition of cause is 
relevant to the present experiment on two counts. First, 
this view supplements those of Einhorn and Hogarth (1986), 
Mackie (1974), and the attribution theorists (see below) in 
that it allows for the special place of human intervention 
or action in the set of possible causes of an event. While 
other theories appear to have no bias against including 
human agency among the possible causes, activity theory 
argues that the search for a causal chain begins with human 
agency. Second, consideration of human agency or intention 
is a necessary prerequisite to a consideration of 
negligence, and thus allows for an explanation of the 
attribution of blame. 
Attribution Theory and the Judgment of Causation 
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The work of attribution theorists is important in a 
discussion of assessment of blame and judgment of causation 
because these theorists attempt to explain how attributions 
of cause and intent arise from observations of action. 
Heider (1958) discussed four elements that are central to 
the way in which he felt an untrained observer would explain 
the causes of action. He argued first that the reason 
people engage in attributional analysis is to discover or 
infer the dispositional features underlying the behavior of 
others. Second, Heider stressed the distinction between 
intentional and unintentional behaviors, suggesting that 
personal dispositions are more readily inferred from 
intentional than unintentional acts. Inferences of 
intentionality are in turn governed by the three criteria of 
equifinality, local causality, and exertion. Equifinality 
refers to the goal-directed nature of human action. When 
several behaviors that tend toward the same goal are 
perceived to be employed by an individual, greater 
intentionality is inferred by an observer than when a single 
strategy is employed. Local causality is found to be 
present when an individual is perceived as originating 
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action rather than being acted upon. Exertion refers to the 
observation that e~fortful activity is regarded as 
intentional or goal directed. The third point made by 
Heider is that there are two sources of the production of an 
act: environmental and personal. The more an individual is 
seen as causing an action, the less the environment is seen 
to have contributed to the outcome. The fourth element of 
attribution suggested by Heider regarding the judgment of 
causality is that of covariation. An effect is attributed 
to a causal event if that event is present when the effect 
is present and absent when the effect is absent. 
Jones and Davis (1965), building upon the work of 
Heider, introduced a theory of Correspondent Inference, 
which suggests that observers appraise the effects of acts 
in making inferences about the actor's dispositions and 
intentions. Correspondence refers to the extent to which 
the act and the underlying attribute are similarly described 
by the inference. Four factors which Jones and Davis 
identified as having influence upon the confidence with 
which inferences are made are normative behavior (or social 
desirability), non-common effects, hedonic relevance, and 
personalism. Acts which are low in social desirability 
indicate more about the actor's dispositions than do 
socially desirable ones. Second, unique consequences or 
effects of the chosen action, as opposed to consequences in 
common with unchosen action, indicate more about the actor's 
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disposition than do common effects. Third, acts with high 
positive or negative valence for the perceiver are judged to 
convey more information than do acts which are of low 
positive or negative valence. Fourth, acts seen as directed 
toward the perceiver are perceived as conveying more 
disposition information than are acts low in personalism. 
Not only are these four factors influential in the 
strength of inferences, but, according to Jones and Davis, 
there are two stages in the process of correspondent 
inference: attribution of intention and attribution of 
disposition. Furthermore, the attribution of intention must 
precede the attribution of disposition. In other words, 
observers make attributions of disposition only on the basis 
of intention on the part of the actor. An attribution of 
intention is made when the observer believes that the actor 
knew his or her behavior would produce the consequences that 
resulted and that the actor had the ability to obtain the 
resultant consequences. Knowledge and ability are therefore 
important aspects of intention. Once an attribution of 
intention has been made, the observer will then attempt to 
infer a personal disposition on the part of the actor 
causing the act. Because correspondent inferences are made 
on the basis of both non-normative behavior and socially 
undesirable consequences of behavior, the inference of 
dispositions on the basis of not reasonable and prudent 
(non-normative) behavior and damages suffered (non-common 
effects) is of concern in the present experiment. 
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Kelley (1967) proposed a model of attribution which 
suggested that observers attend to three types of 
covariation information in attributing locus of causality as 
situational or dispositional: distinctiveness (does the 
target person respond in like manner in different 
circumstances?), consistency (does the target person always 
respond in like manner in the same or similar 
circumstances?), and consensus (do others respond to similar 
circumstances in the manner of the target person?). 
Kelley suggests that causal schemata are employed when 
it is not possible to obtain data necessary for the judgment 
of covariation. Perception of multiple sufficient cause 
means that any of several activities, events, or 
circumstances could produce the effect, while multiple 
necessary cause means that several activities, events, or 
circumstances must co-occur in order to bring about the 
observed effect. In the courtroom, these issues are dealt 
with as issues of sine qua non and substantial factor. The 
sine qua non rule states that the defendant's conduct is a 
cause of the event if the event would not have occurred 
without it. Conversely, that conduct is held not to be a 
cause of the event if the event would have occurred without 
the conduct. This test together with a finding that damages 
followed the negligent act can establish the act as a 
12 
necessary and sufficient condition for the damages, at least 
in these circumstances, and, hence, as a cause in fact. The 
sine qua non rule can be employed in the majority of cases, 
but fails when two events co-occur to bring about a result 
and either alone would have been sufficient to bring about 
the identical outcome. In this case, the defendant's 
conduct is considered a cause of the event if it was a 
material element and a 'substantial factor' in bringing it 
about. Whether the act was a substantial factor is for the 
jury to decide (Prosser p. 266-267). 
The Contribution of Einhorn and Hogarth 
Perhaps the most thorough treatment of the judgment of 
causation is given by Einhorn and Hogarth (1986). In 
'Judging Probable Cause, ' the authors review several 
theories relevant to the judgment of cause within a 
framework of four components. They discuss the roles of 
causal field, cues to causality, determinants of gross 
strength, and, finally, the role of specific alternatives. 
Einhorn and Hogarth argue that people use combinations of 
the above factors, according to systematic rules, to assess 
cause. Causal field refers to the context within which an 
act or event takes place, or in which a judgment is being 
made regarding that action or event. As an example of the 
role of causal field, Einhorn and Hogarth quote Hanson 
(1958). 
There are as many causes to x as there are 
explanations of x. Consider how the cause of death 
might have been set out by the Physician as 
•multiple hemorrhage', by the Barrister as 
'negligence on the part of the driver', and by the 
carriage builder as 'a defect in the brake block'. 
The authors also discuss the concept of causal field 
as treated by Mackie (1965, 1974). Einhorn and Hogarth 
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point out that Mackie's conceptualization of difference in a 
background has three implications for understanding 
judgments of probable cause: The features of events which 
trigger the search for cause, the role of background in 
distinguishing causes from conditions, and shifts in the 
causal field which serve to make particular alternative 
causes more or less salient. 
In discussing the features of events which trigger the 
search for cause, Mackie argues that judgments of causal 
relevance stem from the view of a variable as a 'difference 
in a background.' ·oifference-in-the-background, or Qb, 
refers to the degree to which an action or event deviates 
from the accepted or presumed background. Factors that are 
part of an accepted, or presumed, background are not 
considered in the search for cause or are judged to be of 
little causal relevance. There is experimental evidence in 
the literature to support this view. In a 1985 review of 
studies investigating spontaneous causal reasoning, Weiner 
(1985) stated, 'There is reasonable consensus in the 
reviewed research (six of eight publications) that search is 
elicited by an unexpected event ... (p. 81).' Einhorn and 
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Hogarth, as did Mackie, noted that not all differences in a 
background are relevant to the search for cause because 
perceptions of cause are distinguished from perceptions of 
conditions. A particular genetic makeup, for instance, may 
predispose one to develop a certain disease once one is 
exposed to a certain virus or bacteria, but it would be 
incorrect to say that the physical condition was the cause 
of the disease (Einhorn and Hogarth p. 5). Mackie 
distinguishes perceptions of cause from perceptions of 
conditions as follows: Events (actions or activities) are 
seen as more causal than standing conditions (a state of 
nature) ; unusual or intrusive events are seen as more causal 
than commonly occurring events; and abnormal conditions or 
deviant behaviors are seen as more causal than are normal 
conditions or conforming behaviors. 
Einhorn and Hogarth also point out that shifting 
causal fields may act to convert causes to conditions and 
vice versa, as in the following example which takes place in 
a watch factory . When asked to state the reason why a 
watch crystal had broken, as they imagine a hammer striking 
the watch face, subjects are likely to respond that it was 
the force of the hammer striking the watch which led to the 
breakage. When given additional information, that the 
crystal was struck by the hammer as part of a testing 
procedure, subjects are more likely to attribute the reason 
for the breakage to a defective crystal than to the hammer 
blow. The shift in context, that is, shifts in the causal 
field, can alter the causal strength of competing 
alternatives. 
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The second component of the judgment of causation is 
cues to causality. Once a causal field has been 
established, the strength of the causal link is dependent 
upon various cues to causality. Einhorn and Hogarth use the 
term 'cue' in accord with the definition put forth by 
Brunswick (1952). According to Brunswick's model, cues are 
probabalistic, and because of their probabalistic nature, 
people learn to use multiple cues to guard against the 
failure of depende~ce on single cues. Although multiple 
cues can reduce uncertainty in causal inference, uncertainty 
can be increased if these cues are in conflict with one 
another. Examples of cues to causality, taken from Hume 
(1886) and Mill (1872), are temporal order and contiguity. 
Two other cues discussed by Einhorn and Hogarth are 
covariation and similarity. 
Temporal order may confound judgment of probability, 
when it is integral to such judgment, in three-ways: First, 
people may confuse joint and conditional probabilities as 
illustrated by the following example, presented by Einhorn 
and Hogarth (1986). 'What is the probability of going into 
the supermarket, s, and buying some coffee, K,?' This can be 
interpreted as the probability of S and K or the probability 
of K given s. Second, people judge the probability of data 
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that have causal significance as greater than data that 
simply have diagnostic significance even when the two types 
of data have statistically equal information value. An 
example of this second phenomenon, given by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1980), is that subjects tend to judge the 
probability of a causally significant event, eg. a daughter 
having blue eyes (y) if her mother has blue eyes (x), to be 
greater than the probability of a diagnostically significant 
event, a mother having blue eyes if her daughter has blue 
eyes, although the probability of p(ylx> is equal to p(xly). 
A third way in which temporal order may confound judgments 
of probability is because of what Dawes (1988) terms the 
confusion of inverse probabilities. People have difficulty 
distinguishing between causal probability and diagnostic 
probability when the two probabilities are not equal. In 
this case the information value of x and y is not equal and 
p(xly) fp(ylx). An example of this error is the cautious 
motorist who drives only when more than 25 miles distant 
from his home, since he is aware that most traffic deaths 
occur within 25 miles of one's home (Dawes 1988). 
Contiguity as used by Hume and Mill refers to the 
extent to which events are close in time and space, and is 
an important cue to causality. Low contiguity makes 
perception of a cause-effect relationship difficult. 
Similarity of cause and effect refers not only to the 
physical similarity of antecedent and consequent events but 
also to similarity of the duration or intensity of posited 
causes and effects. 
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Einhorn and Hogarth's conception of covariation as a 
cue to causality is generally consistent with that of Mill 
and Hume. An important difference is that, in Einhorn and 
Hogarth's theory, covariation is not a necessary condition 
for causality, but trades off with similarity. An important 
question raised by.the authors is why covariation need not 
be perfect in order to allow an inference of causality. 
When people say that X caused Y, they usually mean that X 
plus certain other conditions combined to produce Y rather 
than that X is necessary and sufficient to produce Y. 
Einhorn and Hogarth again call upon Mackie and distinguish 
between a minimally sufficient condition and a minimally 
sufficient scenario. A minimally sufficient condition, a, 
is such that given a Y always follows. A minimally 
sufficient scenario is defined as one that would no longer 
be sufficient to cause Y if any of its conjuncts were 
missing. If X is a probable cause of Y, then X is necessary 
for the scenario a, but it is not sufficient [p(Xla)=l but 
P(alX) fO,l]. In this case Xis an insufficient but 
necessary part of a scenario, a, which is itself unnecessary 
but sufficient for Y (!NUS). According to Mackie (1974), in 
assessing the probability that X caused Y, people implicitly 
seek the counterfactual alternative, which is to say that 
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they employ the sine qua non rule, and ask: 'What would have 
happened with regard to Y if X had not occurred?' 
Another factor which is important in the judgment of 
causation is the strength (QL) of the causal chain leading 
from potential cause to effect. Causal chains deal with the 
generative forces linking causes to effects. If no links 
are available, or the strength of any one link is zero, then 
the strength, QL, of the chain that links X and Y is zero. 
In summary, factors influencing gross strength include 
differences in background (Qb), covariation of X and Y (Qc), 
temporal order of X and Y (Qt), contiguity (Qg), similarity 
of cause and effect (Qs), physical similarity (Q's), and the 
role of specific alternatives. Einhorn and Hogarth present 
a rather elegant model for combining multiple cues to 
causality which is of interest in the study of judgment of 
liability as a function of negligence and causation. 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE HYPOTHESIS IN THE PRESENT STUDY 
This study investigated the effect on a judgement of 
liability of arguments for and against defendant's behavior 
being negligent and for and against defendant's behavior 
being a cause of damages to a plaintiff. Subjects were 
assigned to either a plaintiff or defense group, and were 
presented with written scenarios arguing for the presences 
or absence of negligence and causation information. 
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Anderson and Smith (in preparation) recently completed 
a study which provided some of the basis for the present 
research. In that study they investigated the effect of 
presentation of defense counsel negligence and causation 
arguments on jurors' findings of liability. One of the 
major differences between the present study and that of 
Anderson and Smith is that their study examined the effects 
of defense arguments only, while the proposed study will 
examine the effects of both plaintiff and defense arguments. 
Inclusion of plaintiff arguments is believed to yield 
results that will both support and expand the findings of 
the previous study. Results of that study indicated that 
the correlation between judgments of negligence and 
causation, while significant(~= .45, R = .001), were low 
enough to suggest that subjects, in general, did distinguish 
between the concepts of negligence and causation. Anderson 
and Smith also found that subjects, in general, understood 
that the presence of both negligence and causation is 
necessary for a judgment of liability. This latter finding 
indicates that subjects understood the legal definition of 
liability as the conjunction of negligence and causation. 
Anderson and Smith also found, however, that negligence 
information appeared to have had a greater impact on verdict 
judgments than did causation information. Based on those 
findings, one of the tentative conclusions drawn from the 
study was that causation information might present subjects 
with a greater problem in information coding than in 
information integration. 
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The following hypotheses were tested in the present 
study: (Hl) Jurors in both plaintiff and defense conditions 
will have a tendency to make use of negligence information 
more than causal information and will tend to interpret 
negligence information as both negligence and causal 
information. This hypothesis suggests that negligence 
information will have a greater impact on juror 
determinations of defendant liability, negligence and 
causation than will causation information. This hypothesis 
also suggests that jurors who are presented with information 
indicating negligence but not causation will have greater 
confidence in their determinations of liability, negligence, 
and causation than those who were given information 
indicating causation but not negligence. This hypothesis is 
consistent with Einhorn and Hogarth's contention that a 
difference-in-a-background begins a causal search and is a 
component (Qb) of the judgment of probable cause (Einhorn 
and Hogarth, 1986). This hypothesis is suggested by other 
research as well. An event which occurs in close temporal 
proximity prior to, or co-exists with, the occurrence of a 
second event is likely to be interpreted as causally 
relevant due to temporal priority of cause and effect (Mill, 
Hume, Kant and others). An unusual, abnormal, or non-
standard event is interpreted as causally relevant due to 
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difference in a background (Mackie 1974, Einhorn and 
Hogarth, 1986). Non-normative behavior is viewed as non-
standard, unusual, or abnormal, and is therefore interpreted 
as a component of negligence (Jones and Davis 1965). 
(H2) Jurors in the plaintiff condition will rely more upon 
negligence information than will jurors in the defense 
condition. This expectation stems from research on 
cognitive conflict by Berlyne (1962) and Janis and Mann 
(1977), who have argued that cognitive conflict stimulates 
thought. Subjects who are presented with both defense and 
plaintiff arguments would be expected to experience greater 
conflict, to think more deeply, and to be less prone to make 
use of post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning (roughly 
translated as after therefore because) than subjects who are 
presented with only plaintiff arguments and be more prone to 
utilize sine qua non reasoning as prescribed by the court. 
Subjects who employ post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning 
would conclude that damage, having followed negligence, was 
the result of negligence, while subjects who employ the sine 
qua non criterion for judging causation would reason that 
the defendant was not a cause of the damage unless the 
damage would not have occurred but for the action(s) of the 
defendant. 
METHOD 
SUBJECTS 
Subjects were 150 undergraduate student volunteers who 
were given extra credit toward a final grade in a psychology 
class in exchange for participation in the experiment. 
MATERIALS 
Stimulus materials consisted of narrative accounts of 
testimony given in three separate civil trials. These 
narrative accounts are based on actual cases, heard on 
appeal, referenced in Prosser and Keeton on The Law of 
Torts, and cited in the discussion of causation in fact 
(Prosser and Keeton P. 265 f). These cases were amended 
somewhat by the investigator for use in the present 
experiment. 
Data collection instruments consisted of instructions 
to the jury (Appendix A), a verdict form (Appendix B), a 
follow up questionnaire (Appendix C), and a manipulation 
check (Appendix D). 
DESIGN 
The experimental design is a 3 X 2 X 2 X 2 between-
subj ects planned comparison design with an extra condition 
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(described below) to check for order effects. The first 
independent variable is TORT which has three levels. Three 
different tort cases were presented. The second independent 
variable is PARTY which has two levels. Subjects were 
assigned to either a plaintiff condition or a defense 
condition, and heard arguments put forth by either plaintiff 
or defense counsel. The third and fourth independent 
variables, negligence information (NEGINFO), and causation 
information (CAUSINFO), each had two levels. Negligence and 
causation were either suggested, or negated. Thus, in the 
plaintiff condition of the PARTY variable, NEGINFO=l 
indicates no plaintiff negligence argument, and NEGINFO=l 
indicates a plaintiff argument that negligence information 
was present. In the defense condition of the PARTY 
variable, NEGINFO=O indicates a defense argument that 
negligence was not present, and NEGINFO=l indicates no 
defense negligence argument. 
Five subjects were assigned randomly to each of the 
resulting 24 conditions, for a sub-total of 120 subjects. 
The remaining 30 subjects were assigned to those conditions 
in which subjects received both negligence and causation 
arguments, to counterbalance order of presentation. A 
summary of this design is presented in Table I. Figure 1 
gives an explanation of the levels of the independent 
variables included in each condition. 
TABLE I 
TYPES OF INFORMATION PRESENTED 
PLAINTIFF GROUP 
CONDITION 1 (BASE) BO 
CONDITION 2 BO, N+ 
CONDITION 3 BO, C+ 
CONDITION 4 BO, N+, C+ 
DEFENSE GROUP 
CONDITION 5 (BASE) B+ 
CONDITION 6 B+, N-
CONDITION 7 B+, c-
CONDITION 8 B+, N-, C-
BO = Base information indicating neither negligence nor 
causation behavior on the part of the defendant. 
B+ = Base information indicating both negligent and causal 
behavior on the part of the defendant. 
N+ = Indicates negligent behavior on the part of the 
defendant. 
N- = Indicates non-negligent behavior on the part of the 
defendant. 
c+ = Indicates defendant's behavior was a cause of injury. 
c- = Indicates defendant's behavior was not a cause of 
injury. 
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c + 
c 0 
PLAINTIFF 
GROUP 
treatment treatment 
condition condition 
3 4a,4b 
treatment treatment 
conditiori condition 
1 2 
N 0 N + 
c + 
c -
DEFENSE 
GROUP 
treatment treatment 
condition condition 
6 5 
treatment treatment 
condition condition 
8a,8b 7 
N - N + 
Figure 1. Block diagram of experimental conditions. 
In the plaintiff group, those assigned to the base 
condition were presented with stimuli giving neutral 
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information (BO), while those in conditions two through four 
were presented with various combinations of information 
asserting negligence (N+) and/or causation (C+) on the part 
of the defendant. Subjects assigned to condition two were 
presented with base and negligence information (BO, N+), 
subjects in condition three were presented with base and 
causation information (BO, C+), subjects in condition 4a 
were presented with base, negligence, and causation 
information (BO, N+, C+). Subjects in condition 4b were 
presented with the same information as subjects in condition 
4a except that the order of presentation of negligence and 
causation information was reversed (BO, c+, N+). 
In the defense group, subjects assigned to the base 
condition (condition 5) were presented with stimuli giving 
information suggesting liability (negligence and causation) 
on the part of the defendant (B+), while subjects in 
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conditions six through eight were presented, in addition, 
with various combinations of information asserting an 
absence of negligence (N-), and/or causation (C-), on the 
part of the defendant. Within this defense group, subjects 
assigned to condition six were presented with base and 
negligence information (B+, N-), those subjects in condition 
seven were presented with base and causation information 
(B+, c-), and subj~cts in condition Sa were presented with 
base, negligence, and causation information (B+, N-, C-). 
Subjects in condition Sb were presented with the same 
information as subjects in condition Sa except that the 
order of presentation of negligence and causation 
information was reversed (B+, c-, N-). Dependent measures 
consisted of three dichotomous and three continuous 
variables summarized in Table II. 
The dichotomous variables were obtained by asking 
subjects to respond by circling 'YES' or 'NO' to questions 
concerning verdict outcome (VERD), defendant negligence 
(NEG), and the causal nature of defendant's action (CAUSE). 
The continuous variables, considered interval and rated on a 
scale of 0-10 were obtained by asking jurors to circle the 
point on the scale corresponding to their certainty of 
defendant liability (VERDCERT), negligence (NEGCERT), and 
causal behavior (CAUSCERT). The data collection instruments 
are presented in appendices A and B. 
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TABLE II 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
DICHOTOMOUS CONTINUOUS 
LIABILITY VERD VERD CERT 
NEGLIGENCE NEG NEGCERT 
CAUSATION CAUSE CAUSCERT 
STRENGTH OF 
CAUSATION INFO ----- SCAUSE 
STRENGTH OF 
NEGLIGENCE INFO ----- SNEG 
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As a manipulation check of the strength of information 
presented by the variables NEGINFO and CAUSINFO, subjects 
were given a definition of negligence and causation and 
asked to report, op a nine point scale ranging from •no 
information' to 'full information', the strength of 
negligence (SNEG) and causation information (SCAUSE) present 
in the case which they read. 
PROCEDURE 
Subjects were randomly assigned to either the 
plaintiff or defense group, one of the five treatment 
conditions as explained in the design section, and one of 
the three torts. After reading their particular version of 
the case, subjects were given instructions and asked to 
complete a verdict form which asked them, as jurors, to 
decide whether the defendant acted in a negligent manner and 
if so, whether, that negligence contributed to or was a 
cause of the damages suffered by the plaintiff. After 
indicating their verdict in the case, subjects were asked 
several follow-up questions to determine how they made use 
of the information presented to them. Subjects were asked 
specifically how they considered negligence and causation 
information at the time of the verdict. Subjects also were 
asked whether or not they felt that the defendant's actions 
were negligent and, separately, whether or not they felt the 
defendant's actions were a cause of damage to the plaintiff. 
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Additionally, subjects were asked to rate, on a scale of one 
to ten, the confidence they had in their judgments of 
causation and negligence. Finally, subjects were asked to 
re-read the experimental treatment passage to which they 
were exposed, and to rate, on a scale of zero to nine, how 
much negligence information and, on a similar scale, how 
much causation information was presented with respect to the 
target testimony. 
RESULTS 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used in a preliminary 
analysis to determine the effect of order of presentation of 
evidence, and in the main analysis to determine the effects 
of TORT, PARTY, NEGINFO, and CAUSINFO, on continuous 
dependent measures. MANOVA was considered but not used 
because there was a single primary variable of interest. 
The only use of other outcome measures was to give 
information about the process by which a verdict was 
reached. Chi-square tests of independence and log linear 
analysis were used to test the effects of these IVs on 
dichotomous outcome measures. Planned comparisons were 
carried out to contrast differences between selected 
treatment conditions on these same verdict outcome measures. 
ORDER OF PRESENTATION 
As a preliminary step, a two-way analysis of variance 
was used to test for the effects of PARTY and order of 
presentation of NEGINFO and CAUSINFO on certainty of 
defendant liability (VERDCERT). This ANOVA compared 
conditions 4a with 4b and Sa with Sb. No significant order 
effects were found, ~ (1, 56) = 1.479, £ >.1. Significant 
effects were found for PARTY, ~ (1,56) = 39.20, £ < .01. 
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Because no effects were found for order of 
presentation, subjects in conditions 4a and 4b, and subjects 
in conditions Sa and Sb, were combined, by randomly 
selecting five subjects from each of the two counterbalanced 
conditions in each pair, to form a total of eight conditions 
of five subjects each. A block diagram of this 
configuration is included in Table 1. 
TORT BY PARTY BY NEGINFO BY CAUSINFO 
The first step in the main analysis was to perform a 
four way ANOVA to test the effects of TORT, PARTY, NEGINFO, 
and CAUSINFO on certainty of defendant liability. The four-
way interaction was found to be significant, E (2, 96) = 
3.lSl, E <.05. Main effects were found for TORT, E (2, 96) 
= 3.17, E <.05, PARTY, E (1, 96) = 17.32, E <.001, and 
NEGINFO, E (1, 96) = 27.32, E <.001. The nature of this 
interaction was the presence, in tort one only, of a three 
way interaction involving PARTY, NEGINFO, AND CAUSINFO. One 
interpretation of this finding is that the interaction 
occurred a result of the particular story used as stimulus 
material in TORT one. An effort to determine if the stories 
used differed in the strength of negligence (SNEG) and 
strength of causation (SCAUSE) information was inconclusive. 
Mean levels of these variables were examined with the 
following result. For negligence information, the mean 
levels reported were: 5.74, 5.6, and 5.1, for TORTs one two 
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and three respectively. For causation information, the 
means were 5.44, 5.32, and 5.56 for TORTs one, two, and 
three respectively. No significant differences were found 
between cases in the strength of negligence, E (2, 147) ~ 
>.05, nor causation information E (2, 147) .116, ~ >.05. A 
second interpretation is gleaned from open ended responses 
which were collected but not meant to be a part of the 
present research. It seems that in tort one, various 
subjects mentioned that they felt the plaintiff had 
contributed to cause his injuries in some way, where as in 
torts two and three this was not the case. 
Log linear models represent relations among 
categorical variables in a contingency table by linear 
effects on logarithms of observed cell frequencies. In a 
log linear model, a main effect for a factor represents 
unequal marginal frequencies for the levels of the factor 
while the interaction effect represents the joint effect of 
the variables on cell frequencies. Log-linear analysis was 
used to model VERD as a function of TORT, by PARTY, by 
NEGINFO by CAUSINFO. Chi-Square was found to be non-
significant, K2 (1, N = 120) = 1.081 ~ > .05, indicating 
that there was no effect of the four way interaction of 
TORT, by PARTY, by NEGINFO by CAUSINFO. 
The reason for the difference in outcomes between 
analysis done using ANOVA and log-linear analysis is 
difficult to pinpoint, although it was consistent throughout 
33 
the research. It is possible that the difference was due to 
a difference in precision between the continuous and 
dichotomous measures. The dichotomous variable, because it 
is less sensitive, leads to a failure to reject the null 
hypothesis even when the same outcome, measured as a 
continuous variable allows for rejection. 
PARTY BY NEGINFO BY CAUSINFO 
Given the significance of the four-way interaction 
effect on VERDCERT, the next step was to run three-way 
ANOVAs for each TORT to test the effects of PARTY, NEGINFO, 
and CAUSINFO on the three outcome variables , VERDCERT, 
NEGCERT, and CAUSCERT. These results are presented in 
Tables III through VI. Only one significant interaction was 
found. The interaction of PARTY by NEGINFO by CAUSINFO was 
found to have a significant effect on VERDCERT in TORT one ~ 
(1, 32) = 4.17, ~ <.05. Figure 2 shows NEGINFO had an 
effect on VERDCERT in both the PLAINTIFF and DEFENSE 
conditions while CAUSINFO and the NEGINFO x CAUSINFO 
interaction had no effect in either the PLAINTIFF or DEFENSE 
conditions. The absence of any difference in the pattern of 
these effects across plaintiff and defense conditions, 
coupled with the the appearance of this interaction in tort 
1 only calls into question the practical significance of 
this finding and makes interpretation ambiguous at best. 
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TABLE 111 
THREE-WAY ANOVA DEPENDENT MEASURE VERDCERT 
TORT 1 
SOURCE SUM-OF-SQUARES OF MEAN-SQUARE F-RATIO p 
NEG INFO 84.100 1 84.100 9.909 0.004 
CAUSINFO 2.500 1 2.500 0.295 0.591 
PARTY 3.600 1 3.600 0.424 0.520 
NEG INFO* 
CAUSINFO 0.400 1 0.400 0.047 0.830 
NEG INFO* 
PARTY 4.900 1 4.900 0.577 0.453 
CAUSINFO* 
PARTY 0.900 1 0.900 0.106 0.747 
NEGINFO* 
CAUSINFO* 
PARTY 40.000 1 40.000 4.713 0.037 
ERROR 271.600 32 8.488 
TORT 2 
SOURCE SUM-OF-SQUARES DF MEAN-SQUARE F-RATIO p 
NEG INFO 67.600 1 67.600 9.166 0.005 
CAUSINFO 0.400 1 0.400 0.054 0.817 
PARTY 78.400 1 78.400 10.631 0.003 
NEG INFO* 
CAUSINFO 4.900 1 4.900 0.664 0.421 
NEG INFO* 
PARTY 4.900 1 4.900 0.664 0.421 
CAUSINFO* 
PARTY 4.900 1 4.900 0.664 0.421 
NEG INFO* 
CAUSINFO* 
PARTY l0.000 1 10.000 1.356 0.253 
ERROR 236.000 32 7.375 
TORT 3 
SOURCE SUM-OF-SQUARES OF MEAN-SQUARE F-RATIO p 
NEG INFO 55.225 1 55.225 8.258 0.007 
CAUSINFO 2.025 1 2.025 0.303 0.586 
PARTY 81.225 1 81.225 12.146 0.001 
NEG INFO* 
CAUSINFO 1.225 1 1.225 0.183 0.672 
NEG INFO* 
PARTY 3.025 1 3.025 0.452 0.506 
CAUSINFO* 
PARTY 0.025 1 0.025 0.004 0.952 
NEG INFO* 
CAUSINFO* 
PARTY 0.225 1 0.225 0.034 0.856 
ERROR 214.000 32 6.688 
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TABLE IV 
THREE-WAY ANOVA DEPENDENT MEASURE NEGCERT 
TORT 1 
SOURCE SUM-OF-SQUARES OF MEAN-SQUARE F-RATIO p 
NEGINFO 168.100 1 168.100 20.850 0.000 
CAUSINFO 22.500 1 22.500 2.791 0.105 
PARTY 0.400 1 0.400 0.050 0.825 
NEG INFO* 
CAUSINFO 10.000 1 10.000 1.240 0.274 
NEG INFO* 
PARTY 0.100 1 0.100 0.012 0.912 
CAUSINFO* 
PARTY 0.100 1 0.100 0.012 0.912 
NEG INFO* 
CAUSINFO* 
PARTY 0.400 1 0.400 0.050 0.825 
ERROR 258.000 32 8.063 
TORT 2 
SOURCE SUM-OF-SQUARES OF MEAN-SQUARE F-RATIO p 
NEG INFO 105.625 1 105.625 11.851 0.002 
CAUSINFO 0.625 1 0.625 0.070 0.793 
PARTY 105 .625 1 105.625 11.851 0.002 
NEG INFO* 
CAUSINFO 1.225 1 1.225 0.137 0.713 
NEG INFO* 
PARTY 0.225 1 0.225 0.025 0.875 
CAUSINFO* 
PARTY 0.625 1 0.625 0.070 0.793 
NEGINFO* 
CAUSINFO* 
PARTY 5.625 1 5.625 0.631 0.433 
ERROR 285.200 32 8.913 
TORT 3 
SOURCE SUM-OF-SQUARES DF MEAN-SQUARE F-RATIO p 
NEGINFO 60.025 1 60.025 8.251 0.007 
CAUSINFO 0.625 1 0.625 0.086 0.771 
PARTY 81.225 1 81.225 11.165 0.002 
NEG INFO* 
CAUSINFO 7.225 1 7.225 0.993 0.326 
NEG INFO* 
PARTY 0.225 1 0.225 0.031 0.862 
CAUSINFO* 
PARTY 24.025 1 24.025 3.302 0.079 
NEG INFO* 
CAUSINFO* 
PARTY 1.225 1 1.225 0.168 0.684 
ERROR 232.800 32 7.275 
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TABLE V 
THREE-WAY ANOVA DEPENDENT MEASURE CAUSCERT 
TORT 1 
SOURCE SUM-OF-SQUARES OF MEAN-SQUARE F-RATIO p 
NEG INFO 112.225 1 112.225 13.320 0.001 
CAUSINFO 3.025 1 3.025 0.359 0.553 
PARTY 0.625 1 0.625 0.074 0.787 
NEG INFO* 
CAUSINFO 11.025 1 11.025 1.309 0.261 
NEG INFO* 
PARTY 0.225 1 0.225 0.027 0.871 
CAUSINFO* 
PARTY 1.225 1 1.225 0.145 0.705 
NEG INFO* 
CAUSINFO* 
PARTY 3.025 1 3.025 0.359 0.553 
ERROR 269.600 32 8.425 
TORT 2 
SOURCE SUM-OF-SQUARES OF MEAN-SQUARE F-RATIO p 
NEGINFO 16.900 1 16.900 1.578 0.218 
CAUSINFO 6.400 1 6.400 0.597 0.445 
PARTY 40.000 1 40.000 3.734 0.062 
NEG INFO* 
CAUSINFO 3.600 1 3.600 0.336 0.566 
NEG INFO* 
PARTY 0.400 1 0.400 0.037 0.848 
CAUSINFO* 
PARTY 36.100 1 36.100 3.370 0.076 
NEG INFO* 
CAUSINFO* 
PARTY 4.900 1 4.900 0.457 0.504 
ERROR 342.800 32 10. 713 
TORT 3 
SOURCE SUM-OF-SQUARES OF MEAN-SQUARE F-RATIO p 
NEG INFO 27.225 1 27.225 2.643 0.114 
CAUSINFO 1.225 1 1.225 0.119 0.732 
PARTY 46.225 1 46.225 4.488 0.042 
NEG INFO* 
CAUSINFO 9.025 1 9.025 0.876 0.356 
NEGINFO* 
PARTY 4.225 1 4.225 0.410 0.526 
CAUSINFO* 
PARTY 3.025 1 3.025 0.294 0.592 
NEG INFO* 
CAUSINFO* 
PARTY 4.225 1 4.225 0.410 0.526 
ERROR 329.600 32 10.300 
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TABLE VI 
MEAN RATINGS OF VERDICT OUTCOME, 
CERTAINTY OF NEGLIGENCE, AND CERTAINTY OF CAUSATION 
TORT ONE 
CONDITION VERT CERT NEGCERT CAUSCERT 
mean Sd mean Sd mean Sd 
CONDITION 1 1.2 2.1 1.2 2.1 2.0 3.9 
CONDITION 2 6.6 3.6 4.2 3.9 3.6 2.5 
CONDITION 3 3.8 1.7 1.6 2.0 .6 1.3 
CONDITION 4 5.6 3.9 7.0 3.5 6.6 1.8 
CONDITION 5 6.0 2.2 6.4 2.2 5.6 1.9 
CONDITION 6 1.6 3.0 1.6 2.6 1.6 2.6 
CONDITION 7 3.6 2.9 4.2 3.9 4.2 4.2 
CONDITION 8 3.6 2.9 1.0 .70 1.2 1.3 
TORT TWO 
CONDITION VERT CERT NEGCERT CAUSCERT 
mean Sd mean Sd mean Sd 
CONDITION 1 6.2 3.9 5.8 4.6 6.6 3.6 
CONDITION 2 7.8 1.5 7.8 1.5 6.8 2.6 
CONDITION 3 4.0 2.4 4.2 2.2 4.2 2.9 
CONDITION 4 9.0 1.0 8.4 3.0 7.0 3.3 
CONDITION 5 5.2 3.1 4.8 3.3 6.0 3.8 
CONDITION 6 3.6 3.5 1.8 4.0 5.0 4.5 
CONDITION 7 4.6 3.0 5.2 2.1 3.4 2.5 
CONDITION 8 2.4 1.8 1.4 1.3 2.2 2.2 
TORT THREE 
CONDITION VERT CERT NEGCERT CAUSCERT 
mean Sd mean Sd mean Sd 
CONDITION 1 4.0 3.8 6.0 2.6 4.6 3.8 
CONDITION 2 6.4 2.0 7.4 1.9 7.2 1.9 
CONDITION 3 4.0 3.3 3.0 3.5 6.4 3.2 
CONDITION 4 7.4 2.3 6.8 2.4 5.8 3.7 
CONDITION 5 3.8 3.0 5.0 4.0 4.4 3.3 
CONDITION 6 1.8 2.0 2.2 1.9 2.4 1.6 
CONDITION 7 3.2 2.0 3.2 2.8 5.6 4.2 
CONDITION 8 1.6 .5 1.4 .9 3.0 2.7 
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Figure 2. Tort one: three way interaction party by 
negligence by causation. 
PARTY 
Main effects of PARTY on VERDCERT were found in TORT 
two, E (1, 32) = 10.63, g <.01, and TORT three E (1, 32) = 
12.14, g <.01. In both torts, subjects in the plaintiff 
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condition assigned.significantly higher liability ratings to 
the defendant than did those in the defense condition. Main 
effects of PARTY on NEGCERT were also found in TORT two E 
(1, 32) = 11.85, g <.01, and TORT three E (1, 32) = 11.16, g 
<.01. Again, in torts two and three, subjects in the 
plaintiff condition assigned significantly higher certainty 
of liability ratings to the defendant than did those in the 
defense condition. The only significant effect of PARTY on 
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CAUSCERT was a main effect found in tort three in which 
plaintiff subject's ratings of the certainty of defendant's 
behavior as a cause of damage to the plaintiff were 
significantly higher than those of defense condition 
subjects f (1, 32) = 4.48, g <.05. 
NEG INFO 
Main effects of NEGINFO on VERDCERT, NEGCERT, and 
CAUSCERT were found in all three TORTs with g < .01. In all 
instances the presence of negligence information resulted in 
a higher level of certainty of defendant liability, 
negligence, and causation than did its absence. These 
results support hypothesis one. Other than the three-way 
interaction between PARTY, NEGINFO, and CAUSINFO, found in 
Tort one, f (1, 32) = 4.17, g <.05, no other interaction 
effects involving NEGINFO were found. 
CAUSINFO 
For no tort was a significant main effect of CAUSINFO 
found on the continuous verdict outcome measures. 
The findings of significant main effects of NEGINFO 
and non-significant effects of CAUSINFO on jurors' certainty 
of judgment of liability replicate the findings of Anderson 
and Smith. 
A proper understanding by jurors of the negligence 
causation relationship requires that these be treated as 
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separate concepts, and that the existence of one not be 
inferred on the basis of evidence of the other, the post-
hoc-ergo-propter-hoc fallacy. In the present experiment, 
the conditional probability of a finding of causation, given 
information suggesting negligence, was .50 (30/60), while 
the conditional probability of a finding of negligence, 
given information suggesting causation, was .37 (22/60). 
There is no direct test of the significance of the 
difference between these probabilities; however, in testing 
the null hypothesis that each of these proportions was 
significantly above .5, it was found that they were not. 
Another analysis looked at the relationship between NEGINFO 
and CAUSE, and CAUSINFO and NEG. A chi-square test of the 
independence of NEGINFO and CAUSE was significant, ~2 (1, N 
= 120) = 6.91 P < .01, while a chi-square test of the 
independence of CAUSINFO and NEG was not significant, ~2 (1, 
N = 120) = .036 ~ > .8. In the presence of NEGINFO subjects 
found CAUSE to be present half the time and found cause to 
be absent half the time (30/60). In the absence of NEGINFO 
subjects found cause to be present 27% (16/60) of the time 
and absent 73% (44/60) of the time. These findings tend to 
support Hypothesis one. Jurors did have more tendency to 
infer causation when presented with evidence of negligence, 
than to find negligence when presented with causation 
information. It also appears that the absence of NEGINFO 
rather than the presence of NEGINFO is driving the verdict. 
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Another way to assess jurors' understanding of the 
concepts of negligence and causation is to look at the 
frequency with which findings of negligence and causation 
co-occur. The conditional probability of a causation-
present judgment given a negligence-present judgment was 
.744 (32/43), while the conditional probability of a 
negligence-present judgment given a causation-present 
judgment was only slightly lower at .695 (32/46). Because 
these proportions are derived from the same matrix, a direct 
test of the significance of the difference between these two 
conditional probabilities is possible. A chi-square test of 
independence between the variables negcert and causcert was 
significant, X2 (1, ~ = 120) = 36.91 ~ < .001. Dividing the 
difference between the two proportions by the standard error 
of the difference yields a normal deviate z-score of 3.18. 
These results along with the previous Chi-square analysis 
suggests that jurors, although treating negligence and 
causation information as fairly distinct concepts, also tend 
to infer causation from a negligence judgment. The results 
of these chi-square tests are presented in Table seven. 
TABLE VI I 
NEGLIGENCE CAUSATION RELATIONSHIP 
ABSENT 
NEG INFO 
PRESENT 
NEG 
ABSENT PRESENT TOTAL 
53 
24 
7 
36 
6 
60 
TOTAL 77 43 120 
PEARSON CHI-SQUARE = 30.480 f = 0.000 
ABSENT 
NEGINFO 
PRESENT 
CAUSE 
ABSENT PRESENT TOTAL 
44 16 60 
30 30 60 
TOTAL 74 46 120 
PEARSON CHI-SQUARE = 6.910 f = 0.009 
NEG 
ABSENT PRESENT TOTAL 
ABSENT I 39 21 60 
CAUSINFO 
PRESENT 38 22 60 
TOTAL 77 43 120 
PEARSON CHI-SQUARE = 0.036 f = 0.849 
ABSENT 
CAUSINFO 
PRESENT 
CAUSE 
ABSENT PRESENT TOTAL 
36 24 60 
38 22 60 
TOTAL 74 46 120 
PEARSON CHI-SQUARE= 0.141 f = 0.707 
NEG 
ABSENT PRESENT TOTAL 
ABSENT I 63 14 77 
CAUSE 
PRESENT I 11 32 43 
TOTAL 74 46 120 
PEARSON CHI-SQUARE = 36.914 f = 0.000 
NEG and CAUSE 
NEG=O NEG=1 NEG=O NEG=1 
CAUSE=O CAUSE=O CAUSE=1 CAUSE=1 TOTAL 
0 54 5 10 
VERO 
9 6 4 
TOTAL 63 11 14 
PEARSON CHI-SQUARE= 61.300 f = 0.000 
70 
31 50 
32 120 
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THE NEGLIGENCE/CAUSATION/LIABILITY RELATIONSHIP 
A proper understanding of the concept of liability 
requires that jurors not only be able to distinguish the 
concepts of negligence and causation, but also are able to 
render a finding of liability only on the occurrence of 
their conjunction. Of 50 subjects who found liability 
present, 31 instances (62%) occurred under a joint 
negligence-present judgment and causation-present judgment 
condition. Nineteen liability judgements occurred under a 
condition in which negligence or causation or both was 
judged to be present. 
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A chi-square test of independence was used to examine 
the frequency of liability judgments under the condition of 
a joint finding of negligence and causation. The resulting 
chi-square test was significant ~2 (1, N = 120) = 4.94 E < 
.05, leading to the conclusion that jurors did, in fact, 
understand the concept of liability as composed of the joint 
occurrence of negligence and causation. It also appears 
that jurors, although they understand the concept of 
liability as composed of the joint occurrence of negligent 
and causal behavior on the part of a defendant, none the 
less have trouble distinguishing negligent from causal 
behavior, and therefore tend to interpret negligent behavior 
as evidence of causal activity. 
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MANIPULATION CHECK 
As a manipulation check of the variables NEGINFO and 
CAUSINFO, subjects were given a definition of negligence and 
causation and asked to report, on a nine-point scale ranging 
from 'no information' to 'full information', the strength of 
negligence and causation information present in the case 
which they read. One use of the manipulation check was to 
determine if the strength of negligence and causation 
information was equal across torts. For negligence 
information, the overall mean was 5.48 with mean levels of 
5.74, 5.6, and 5.1, for torts one, two, and three 
respectively. For causation information, the overall mean 
was 5.44 with means of 5.44, 5.32, and 5.56 for cases one, 
two, and three respectively. No significant difference 
found was between means of the strength of negligence and 
causation information for any tort. Another purpose of the 
manipulation check was to insure that the variables NEGINFO 
and CAUSINFO did in fact lead to negligence and causation 
ratings. To accomplish this, a variable, DIF, was created 
by subtracting SCAUSE from SNEG. The expectation was that 
paragraphs containing only NEGINFO should have DIFs 
significantly higher than zero and paragraphs containing 
CAUSINFO should have DIFs significantly less than zero. T-
tests were conducted to see if the mean Dif of conditions 2, 
3, 6, and 7 did in fact differ significantly, and in the 
expected direction, from zero. None of these tests were 
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significant and in all cases the difference was negative. 
This finding suggests that whether subjects were subjected 
to NEGINFO or CAUSINFO, they had a tendency to judge SCAUSE 
to be greater than SNEG. 
DISCUSSION 
Hypothesis one predicted that jurors in both plaintiff 
and defense conditions would tend to take into account 
negligence information more than causation information in 
reaching a determination of liability. This tendency was 
operationalized by a higher frequency of plaintiff verdicts 
rendered by those jurors presented with evidence suggesting 
non-causal negligence than by those jurors presented with 
evidence suggesting the causal nature of non-negligent 
behavior. This hypothesis also predicted that jurors who 
were presented with information indicating negligence but 
not causation would have greater confidence in their 
determinations of liability, negligence, and causation than 
those who were given information indicating causation but 
not negligence. This hypothesis received partial support. 
No significant differences were found, for any TORT, on any 
dependant measure, between condition two, in which 
negligence was indicated and causation was neutral, and 
condition three, in which negligent behavior was indicated 
and causation was negated. Significant differences were 
found, for tort one only, in confidence of verdict outcome 
between conditions seven and six. This latter finding, that 
in the defense condition information indicating negligence 
but negating causation resulted in higher ratings of 
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liability than did information indicating causation but 
negating negligence, suggests that jurors did in fact tend 
to interpret negligence information as both negligence and 
causation information. Additional support for this 
hypothesis is shown by the difference in certainty of 
causation ratings between condition seven and condition six 
for TORT one. When information indicating negligence but 
negating causation was presented, it resulted in higher 
ratings of confidence in both defendant liability and 
causation than did information negating negligence but 
indicating causation. Similar significant findings were not 
found in the other torts. 
Significant differences in verdict outcome were found 
between conditions two and seven for torts two and three. 
This finding supports hypothesis two, suggesting that the 
presence of negligence information in the plaintiff group, 
where the causation information was neutral, resulted in 
higher certainty of liability ratings than did negligence 
information in the defense group, where negligence 
information was presented in conjunction with information 
negating causation. This hypothesis is also supported by 
the finding of a significant difference in certainty of 
defendant negligence ratings between those in groups two and 
seven in torts two and three. Those in the plaintiff group, 
who were given causation neutral and negligence present 
information, were more certain of the defendant's 
negligence than those in the defense group who were given 
causation absent and negligence present information. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this study show fairly strong support 
for hypothesis one and mixed support for hypothesis two. 
Jurors in both the plaintiff and defense conditions had a 
tendency to make use of negligence information as evidence 
of both negligent and causal behavior on the part of a 
defendant. Additionally, jurors in the plaintiff group 
tended to have a higher degree of confidence in defendant 
liability than those in the corresponding defense group. 
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Ideally, the.narrative accounts used as stimuli in 
this study would have allowed a sharp distinction between 
full and no information regarding the elements of negligence 
and causation to have been introduced. The obtained results 
suggest that although the strength of the information 
presented to subjects was not as great as desired, there was 
nonetheless a balanced presentation of negligence and 
causation information. By assimilating the open ended 
responses given by subjects to the follow-up questions in 
this study, adjustments in this stimulus strength can be 
made and incorporated into future research. 
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JUDGE'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
It is now the duty of the court to instruct you as to the 
law. Under our legal system, the court decides all questions 
of law and procedure arising during a trial, and it is the 
jury's duty to follow the court's instructions in these 
matters. 
On the other hand,.the jury is the sole and exclusive judge 
of the facts and of the reliability of the evidence. The 
jury's power, however, is not arbitrary; and, if the court 
instructs you as to the law on a particular subject or how 
to judge the evidence, you must follow such instructions. 
Negligence and causation. The law assumes that all persons 
have obeyed the law and have been free from negligence. 
Accordingly, the fact that there has been an injury or death 
is no indication that anyone was negligent. 
In order for the plaintiff, to establish fault on the part 
of the defendant, the plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was 
negligent in at least one of the ways alleged which was a 
cause of injury or damage to the plaintiff. 'Damage' refers, 
not just to physical damage, but also to financial and 
emotional damage, such as the costs and emotional pain and 
suffering. 
In general, it is the duty of every person in our society to 
use reasonable care to avoid damage that would be reasonably 
anticipated. Reasonable care is that care which persons of 
ordinary prudence exercise in the management of their own 
affairs to avoid injury to themselves or others. Common-law 
negligence, therefore, is the doing of some act that a 
reasonably careful person would not do, or the failure to do 
something that a reasonably careful person would do under 
the same or similar circumstances. 
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VERDICT FORM 
Was the defendant negligent in one or more of the 
particulars alleged by the plaintiff, and, if so, was such 
negligence a cause of damage to the plaintiff? 
NO YES 
On the scale below please indicate how confident are you in 
this judgment by circling the appropriate point on the 
scale. 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
100% 50/50 100% 
certain completely certain 
there was uncertain there was 
no liability liability 
FOLLOW UP QUESTIONS 
The verdict form you just completed asked whether the 
defendant was liable, that is, NEGLIGENT in one or more of 
the particulars alleged by the plaintiff, and, if so, 
whether such negligence was a CAUSE of damage to the 
plaintiff. 
1. At the time you were completing the form, how were you 
thinking about negligence and causation? 
(Circle 'a' or 'b' below.) 
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a. I treated negligence and causation as roughly the same 
b. I treated negligence and causation as distinct 
concepts. 
2a. Do you believe that the defendant's actions were 
negligent? 
NO YES 
2b. On the scale below please indicate how confident you 
are in this judgment by circling the appropriate point on 
the scale. 
* * * 
100% 
certain 
defendant 
was not 
liable 
* * * 
50/50 
completely 
uncertain 
* * * * * 
100% 
certain 
defendant 
was 
liable 
2c. Briefly explain how you arrive at this judgment. Give 
the reasons that you believe justify this judgment. 
3a. Do you believe that the defendant's action or failure 
to act was a cause of damage to the plaintiff? 
NO YES 
3b. on the scale below please indicate how confident you are 
in this judgment by circling the appropriate point on the 
scale. 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
100% 50/50 100% 
certain · completely certain 
defendant uncertain defendant 
was not was 
a cause a cause 
3c. Briefly explain how you arrive at this judgment. Give 
the reasons that you believe justify this judgment. 
g XIGN:3:ddV 
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strength of Information 
Now please reread the last paragraph on the first page. 
That paragraph may have provided information about 
negligence, causation, or both. Negligence means that the 
defendant did some act that a reasonably careful person 
would not do, or failed to do something that a reasonably 
careful person would do under the same or similar 
circumstances. How much information do you think the last 
paragraph on the first page provides regarding the question 
of whether the defendant was negligent or not? (Circle the 
appropriate number) 
0 1 
No 
Info 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Full 
Info 
Causation means that the damage to the plaintiff resulted 
from or was produced by the defendant's action (or failure 
to act). How much information do you think the last 
paragraph on the first page provides regarding the question 
of whether the defendant caused the damage or not? 
0 1 
No 
Info 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Full 
Info 

PLAINTIFF GROUP ELEMENTS (BO, N+, C+) 
JONES v. NEPTUNE FISHERIES 
BACKGROUND 
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Jerome Jones was drowned while employed as the mate of the 
'Long Island,' a B9ston fishing boat. The boat is owned by 
Neptune Fisheries Company, which is the defendant in this 
case. Mr. Jones' widow, Alice Jones (the plaintiff), is 
suing, on behalf of herself and her four young children, to 
recover damages from the defendant for her husband's death. 
On December 21, 1983, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, the 
'Long Island' left T wharf, Boston, bound for 'Georges,' 
which are fishing banks in Massachusetts waters. About 6 
o'clock, shortly after the vessel passed Boston Light, the 
plaintiff's husband came on deck to relieve Ole Olson at the 
wheel. As Jones was ascending a flight of four steps 
leading from the deck to the pilot house, a freak wave 
struck the vessel, and Jones was thrown overboard. 
(BO) Immediately upon seeing Jones go overboard, Mccue, who 
was the only person on deck at the time, went to the rescue 
boat. He undid the lashings which held the boat in place, 
prepared the boat for lowering, and then lowered the boat 
into the water in an effort to rescue Jones, but by the time 
the boat had been lowered into the water, Jones was nowhere 
to be seen. 
(N+) An expert witness from the Coast Guard testified that 
it is unusual for ~assachusetts fishing vessels to lash 
their lifeboats down in the manner employed by Neptune 
Fisheries, since lashing makes it more difficult to launch 
the boat. He further testified this practice is not in 
accordance with Coast Guard regulations. 
(C+) Olson testified that, immediately after seeing Jones 
fall overboard, he threw the engine into reverse to stop the 
vessel and thereafter continuously kept track of Jones while 
Mccue attempted to launch the life boat. However, by the 
time the life boat was actually launched, Jones had slipped 
beneath the surface of the water. 
STATEMENT OF THE JUDGE TO THE JURY 
You should disregard the fact that Jerome Jones was not 
wearing a life jacket at the time of the accident as this 
not at issue in the present case. The plaintiff, Mrs. 
Jones, acknowledges that Neptune Fisheries did provide life 
jackets for use by crew members, and the defense, Neptune 
Fisheries, acknowledges that life jackets are not worn by 
fishing crew members in these waters except under extreme 
weather conditions. Both parties agree such weather 
conditions did not· exist at the time of the accident. 
DEFENSE GROUP ELEMENTS (B+, N-, C-) 
JONES v. NEPTUNE FISHERIES 
BACKGROUND 
59 
Jerome Jones was drowned while employed as the mate of the 
'Long Island,' a Boston fishing boat. The boat is owned by 
Neptune Fisheries Company, which is the defendant in this 
case. Mr. Jones' widow, Alice Jones (the plaintiff), is 
suing, on behalf of herself and her four young children, to 
recover damages from the defendant for her husband's death. 
On December 21, 1983, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, the 
'Long Island' left.T wharf, Boston, bound for 'Georges,' 
which are fishing banks in Massachusetts waters. About 6 
o'clock, shortly after the vessel passed Boston Light, the 
plaintiff's husband came on deck to relieve Ole Olson at the 
wheel. As Jones was ascending a flight of four steps 
leading from the deck to the pilot house, a freak wave 
struck the vessel, and Jones was thrown overboard. 
(B+) Immediately upon seeing Jones go overboard, Mccue, who 
was the only person on deck at the time, went to the rescue 
boat. He undid the lashings which held the boat in place, 
prepared the boat for lowering, and then lowered the boat 
into the water in an effort to rescue Jones. This process 
took two to three minutes, and by the time the boat had been 
lowered into the water, Jones was nowhere to be seen. The 
plaintiff argues that had the lifeboat been mounted on 
davits (a pulley system for lowering boats) the boat could 
have been lowered in time to have saved Jones, that Neptune 
Fisheries was negligent in the manner in which they mounted 
the life boat and that such mounting was the cause of Jones' 
death since Jones would have been saved if the boat could 
have been launched more quickly. 
(N-) An expert witness from the Coast Guard testified that 
it is usual for Massachusetts fishing vessels to lash their 
lifeboats down in the manner employed by Neptune Fisheries, 
since lashing makes the boat more secure and less likely to 
be damaged or lost in heavy weather. He further testified 
that this practice is in accordance with Coast Guard 
regulations. Neptune Fisheries argues that they were not 
negligent in securing their lifeboats in this manner. 
(C-) Olson testified that, immediately after seeing Jones 
fall overboard, he threw the engine into reverse to stop the 
vessel and then scanned the water for Jones continuously 
thereafter until Mccue gave up the search. However, Olson 
never saw either Jones or any of his clothing. Neptune 
Fisheries argues that Jones slipped beneath the surface of 
the water immediately and that even if they had mounted the 
lifeboat on davits, allowing the lifeboat to be lowered more 
quickly, there never would have been any chance of 
recovering Jones. 
STATEMENT OF THE JUDGE TO THE JURY 
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You should disregard the fact that Jerome Jones was not 
wearing a life jacket at the time of the accident as this 
not at issue in the present case. The plaintiff, Mrs. 
Jones, acknowledges that Neptune Fisheries did provide life 
jackets for use by crew members, and the defense, Neptune 
Fisheries, acknowledges that life jackets are not worn by 
fishing crew members in these waters except under extreme 
weather conditions. Both parties agree that such weather 
conditions did not exist at the time of the accident. 
